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Writing the Dissent in Abrams
Robert Post*
Much has been written about how Oliver Wendell Holmes, in
November 1919, came to write his pathbreaking dissent in Abrams v.
United States,1 which virtually invents First Amendment doctrine. The
most complete account may be found in Thomas Healy’s superb book,
The Great Dissent.2
Holmes’s accomplishment in Abrams is all the more astonishing
because eight months previously, in March 1919, Holmes had authored
decisions sustaining criminal convictions for those who had dared to
speak out against World War I. Holmes’s friends and supporters were
appalled by these opinions, most especially by Debs v. United States,3 in
which Holmes upheld the conviction under the Espionage Act of 19174
of a prominent socialist leader for what amounted to a political speech
opposing American participation in the war.5 In Debs, Holmes deemed
First Amendment protections irrelevant if political speech had its
“natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the
recruiting service” of the United States.6 Virtually all anti-war speeches,
and certainly all successful anti-war speeches, have this tendency and
effect.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1919, Holmes “was both
defensive and defiant” about his opinion in Debs.7 He went so far as to
draft (but not send) a letter of protest to Herbert Croly, editor of The
New Republic, a magazine normally appreciative of Holmes. But even
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250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—
AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (1st ed. 2013).
3 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
4 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (repealed 1921).
5 See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 3,
1919, at 13. See generally Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV.
L. REV. 932, 944, 967–68 (1919).
6 249 U.S. at 216.
7 HEALY, supra note 2, at 137.
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The New Republic had published an article sharply critical of Debs.
Holmes wanted to say to Croly:
I hated to have to write the Debs case . . . and I think it quite
possible that if I had been on the jury I should have been for
acquittal but I cannot doubt that there was evidence
warranting a conviction on the disputed issues of fact.
Moreover, I think the clauses under consideration not only
were constitutional but were proper enough while the war
was on. When people are putting out all their energies in
battle I don’t think it unreasonable to say we won’t have
obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising troops—by
persuasion any more than by force. But in the main I am for
aeration of all effervescing convictions—there is no way so
quick for letting them get flat.8
Holmes’s close friend Learned Hand wrote the Justice, specifically
criticizing Debs.9 In an effort to change Holmes’s mind, his dear friend
Harold Laski even went so far as to arrange a summer tea with the young
Zechariah Chafee, whose brilliant article in the Harvard Law Review
criticizing Debs would foreshadow Holmes’s eventual dissent in
Abrams.10
These external influences are no doubt important for
understanding Holmes’s eventual volte face in Abrams. But anyone who
has closely encountered Holmes’s mind knows that in technical legal
matters he was a sublimely self-confident and self-directed thinker who
regarded his vocation as “preparing small diamonds for people of
limited intellectual means.”11 Holmes was not easily influenced by the
views of others, even those of his friends and admirers. This is well
illustrated in his 1918 correspondence with Learned Hand about
freedom of speech; throughout, Holmes remained blithely oblivious to
Hand’s prescient and forceful arguments in favor of broadly interpreting
the First Amendment.12
In this brief essay, therefore, I shall put aside explanations of
Holmes’s remarkable change of heart that stress external pressure and
disapproval. Instead, I shall offer an internal account that sketches the
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HEALY, supra note 2, at 136–37 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
HEALY, supra note 2, at 112–13.
10 HEALY, supra note 2, at 154–59; see also Chafee, supra note 5.
11 Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (December 1, 1925), in 2 HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK
1874-1932 173 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 1942).
12 See HEALY, supra note 2, at 221–27; Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719,
733–34 (1975).
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factors that Holmes himself might have considered relevant in justifying
his altered understanding of the First Amendment. My hope is to
reconstruct how Holmes might have reasoned his own way from Debs
to Abrams.
Paradoxically, given Holmes’s penchant for pungent Emersonian
sentences, Holmes’s legal approach to decision-making was intensely
architectural. He confronted cases theoretically, seeking first principles
on which to ground his approach. “Cases are like the other problems of
life,” wrote Holmes, “At first they loom vast, black immeasurable, but
presently they shrink to infinitesimal luminous points.”13 For all that
Holmes stressed experience rather than logic, for all that his language
was condensed and poetic, his decisions as a judge were highly
axiomatic. He always sought the exact point on which to rest his
explanation of a case. My hope in this essay is to trace the legal pathway
by which Holmes’s axioms regarding freedom of speech evolved to
reach their powerful and climactic expression in November 1919.
To do that, we need a starting point, which we may take as Holmes’s
1907 opinion in Patterson v. Colorado,14 a case in which a newspaper
was charged with contempt of court for publishing articles and a
cartoon that “reflected upon the motives and conduct of the supreme
court of Colorado in cases still pending, and were intended to embarrass
the court in the impartial administration of justice.”15 The newspaper
raised what we would now characterize as a First Amendment defense,
to which Holmes, citing an 1825 precedent by his predecessor as Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, replied:
But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the
part not only of the United States but also of the states, still we
should be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error
would have us reach. . . . [T] he main purpose of such
constitutional provisions is “to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publications as had been practised by other
governments,” and they do not prevent the subsequent
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare. The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false
as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well
to the true as to the false. This was the law of criminal libel
apart from statute in most cases, if not in all.16
13

OWH to Baroness Moncheur (June 18, 1927) (Holmes papers).
205 U.S. 454 (1907).
15 Id. at 459.
16 Id. at 462 (emphasis in original) (citations to Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass.
304 (1825) omitted).
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It is fair to say, then, that Holmes began the second decade of the
Twentieth Century with a minimal account of the First Amendment,
which he did not believe extended to subsequent punishments such as
those that were at issue in Debs and Abrams. This is roughly in line with
the way elite lawyers typically regarded the First Amendment in the
years before World War I.17 So for example, when in 1915 Harlan Fiske
Stone, then Dean of Columbia Law School, published his one and only
book, Law and Its Administration,18 the future author of footnote 4 of
Carolene Products19 summarized the Bill of Rights in this way:
The more important of these were freedom of religious
worship, the right peaceably to assemble, the right to bear
arms, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the right to a speedy trial by jury, the right not to be
compelled to testify against oneself in a criminal trial, the right
not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and the like.20
Freedom of speech did not even bear mentioning.21
Public attitudes toward freedom of speech changed after America
entered World War I, when the Wilson administration launched a
vicious program of state censorship and propaganda.22 One of the first
repressive measures was enacted on June 15, 1917. Known as the
Espionage Act of 1917, it provided that
whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause
or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United
States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment
service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of
the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both.23
17

See DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 2 (1997).
HARLAN F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1st ed. 1915).
19 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
20 STONE, supra note 18, at 140.
21 Id. But see the first two paragraphs of Footnote 4 of Carolene Products, which in
contrast concentrate on cases involving freedom of speech. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
22 See CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 144–73 (2008); DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST
WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 75–92 (1980); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 38–41 (2014); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS
TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
(2004).
23 Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (June 15, 1917).
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The Wilson administration took a broad view of obstructing the
recruitment and enlistment services. It chose to prosecute persons who
discouraged men from enlisting in the military and naval forces. One of
the first cases to reach the Court involving this policy was Baltzer v.
United States, which was argued on November 6–7, 1918.24 The federal
government successfully charged the defendants in Baltzer with
“wilfully obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service of the United
States” because they sent a petition to the Governor of South Dakota
complaining that certain counties had been improperly exempted from
the draft and that “the Governor should stand for a referendum on the
draft.”25 The Court was apparently ready to affirm the defendants’
convictions. We know this because in Holmes’s papers there is a draft
dissent that he circulated to his brethren.26
Holmes realized that the defendants’ speech could not be charged
as the crime of obstructing the draft, which is all that the 1917
Espionage Act forbade.27 The defendants’ speech was instead merely
“the foolish exercise of a right.”28 “I cannot see how asking a change in
the mode of administering the draft so as to make it accord with what is
supposed to be required by law can be said to obstruct it. . . . From
beginning to end the changes advocated are changes by law, not in
resistance to it . . . .”29 The defendants’ petitions were simply efforts to
persuade a state official to take official state action.
The hysteria of the war years evidently shook Holmes’s belief that
the First Amendment was categorically inapplicable to subsequent
punishments. He wrote in his Baltzer dissent:
Real obstructions of the law, giving real aid and comfort to the
enemy, I should have been glad to see punished more
summarily and more severely than they sometimes were. But
I think that our intention to put out all our powers in aid of
success in war should not hurry us into intolerance of
opinions and speech that could not be imagined to do harm,
although opposed to our own. It is better for those who have
unquestioned and almost unlimited power in their hands to
err on the side of freedom. We have enjoyed so much freedom
24

JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1918 TERM, 11, 45.
Baltzer v. United States, 248 U.S. 593 (1918) (unpublished Holmes dissent)
(Holmes papers).
26 Id. The case is discussed in G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW
AND THE INNER SELF 414 (1993).
27 See Baltzer, (unpublished Holmes dissent) (Holmes papers); Sheldon M. Novick,
The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 332. Brandeis
wrote to Holmes that he would “gladly join” the dissent.
28 Baltzer, (unpublished Holmes dissent) (Holmes papers).
29 Id.
25
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for so long that perhaps we are in danger of forgetting that the
bill of rights which cost so much blood to establish still is
worth fighting for, and that no tittle of it should be abridged. I
agree that freedom of speech is not abridged
unconstitutionally in those cases of subsequent punishment
with which this court has had to deal from time to time. But
the emergency would have to be very great before I could be
persuaded that an appeal for political action through legal
channels, addressed to those supposed to have power to take
such action was an act that the Constitution did not protect as
well after as before.30
The passage strikes notes that, within the year, Holmes would
radically rework in his Abrams dissent. It defends the importance of
tolerance and freedom of discussion. It even intimates that the First
Amendment might apply to some subsequent punishments
(presumably the kind at issue in Baltzer). Yet it seems to propose that
First Amendment protection be extended only in circumstances where
speech is so innocuous that it could not be “imagined to cause harm,”
and even in such circumstances it acknowledges that constitutional
immunity might be overcome in the context of a “very great”
“emergency.”
Baltzer illustrates Holmes’s striking technical mastery. Holmes
plainly grasped the underlying flaw in the government’s case,31 which is
that the defendants’ actions could not count as “obstruction.” Holmes
was vindicated in the end because on December 16, 1918, the
defendants’ convictions were reversed “upon confession of error” by the
government,32 which is why Holmes’s dissent never saw the light of day.
Three weeks later, on January 9–10, 1919, the well-known and
pivotal case of Schenck v. United States33 was argued. The defendant in
Schenck was charged with violating the 1917 Espionage Act by “causing
and attempting to cause insubordination” in the military when the
United States was at war. Schenck had “printed and circulated to men
who had been called and accepted for military service” a leaflet that
30

Baltzer, (unpublished Holmes dissent) (Holmes papers).
See Novick, supra note 27, at 332. In what counts as a perfect irony, Mahlon Pitney
wrote on his return to Holmes’s draft dissent: “I submit, with great respect, that this
reads as if it proceeded from the heart rather than the head.” Pitney added a P.S.: “A
good fault perhaps but still a fault.”
32 Baltzer, 248 U.S. 593; JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1918
TERM, at 83. Alex C. King of Georgia had become the new Solicitor General on December
9, 1918, and he immediately asked that Baltzer be restored to the docket. Id. at 74. King
confessed error on December 16. King would later become the founding partner of King
& Spaulding.
33 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
31
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invoked the 13th Amendment to argue “that conscription was
despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity
in the interest of Wall Street’s chosen few.”34 Schenck argued that the
circulation of his leaflet was protected by the First Amendment.
Given his earlier dissent in Baltzer, it is striking that Holmes was
assigned the opinion for a unanimous Court upholding Schenck’s
conviction. Holmes repeated the hypothetical point he had made earlier
in Baltzer: “It well may be,” he wrote, “that the prohibition of laws
abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated
in Patterson v. Colorado.”35 Yet Holmes acknowledged this point only
the more firmly to emphasize that the First Amendment offered no
protection at all to Schenck.
“The question in every case,” Holmes explained, “is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.”36 Because causing insubordination among
troops could legitimately be charged as a crime, so too could the attempt
to cause insubordination as long as the acts constituting the attempt
were taken with the intent to cause the crime.37 Thus even if Schenck’s
pamphlet had not caused a single solider to rebel, Schenck could
nevertheless be guilty of the attempt to cause insubordination. Holmes
summarized, “If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency
and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground
for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”38
In 1881, Holmes had written of the crime of attempt, “[i]f an act is
done of which the natural and probable effect under the circumstances
is the accomplishment of a substantive crime, the criminal law, while it
may properly enough moderate the severity of punishment if the act has
not that effect in the particular case, can hardly abstain altogether from
punishing it.”39 In Schenck, Holmes reasoned that speech, even speech

34

Id. at 49–51.
Id. at 51–52.
36 Id. at 52.
37 “It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were
proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced.” Id.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 1963)
(1881).
35
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that seeks to persuade, is an “act”40 whose “tendency” and “intent” can
satisfy the elements of the crime of attempt. The implicit but
undefended premise is that the First Amendment poses no bar to the
prosecution of crimes.
Holmes turned his opinion in Schenck entirely on the construction
of the criminal law of attempt. His initial tentative acknowledgment that
the First Amendment may, in some circumstances, apply to subsequent
punishment is purely hypothetical, as it was not perhaps in Baltzer.
Holmes’s use of the phrase “clear and present danger” appears to refer
to the relationship that an act must have to criminal conduct in order to
constitute the distinct crime of attempt. But Holmes’s deployment of the
phrase is loose and misleading. Not only is it immediately modified by
the concept of “tendency,” but one week later in Debs Holmes offered a
definitive explication of the kind of relationship to a crime that words
must have in order to warrant prosecution as an attempt to commit the
crime.
Like Charles Schenck, Eugene Debs was also prosecuted for
violating the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting “to cause and incite
insubordination” in the military.41 The government charged that, with
intent to cause such insubordination, Eugene Debs “delivered, to an
assembly of people, a public speech” whose “main theme” was “to
encourage those present to obstruct the recruiting service.”42 Debs’s
speech was a standard political barnburner that opposed World War I.
It was not delivered to draftees but to a convention of the Socialist Party.
“We brand the declaration of war by our Governments as a crime against
the people of the United States and against the nations of the world,”
Debs declared, “In all modern history there has been no war more
unjustifiable than the war in which we are about to engage.”43
Holmes conceptualized the legal issues in Debs exactly as he had
conceptualized them in Schenck. Everyone agreed that causing
insubordination among soldiers could be made a crime. This crime
could be committed by words as well as by deeds. Advocating the
accomplishment of the crime could be punished as an attempt to commit
the crime, so long as “the words used had as their natural tendency and
reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service” and so

40 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. As one commentator said about Debs, “The fact of the
matter is that words are deeds.” Letter to the Editor, The Debs Case, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
May 31, 1919, at 151.
41 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919).
42 Id. at 212–13.
43 Id. at 216.
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long as “the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind.”44 The
logic of Debs makes crystal clear that the phrase “clear and present
danger” in Schenck had been nothing more than a rhetorical flourish.
Debs holds that an “act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,)” can
constitutionally be punished as an attempt to commit a crime if with the
appropriate intent it has the “tendency” to produce that crime. This is
what is now called the “bad tendency” test, which Holmes developed in
Schenck to express the substantive criminal law of attempt, not the
independent requirements of the First Amendment.
Debs rightly provoked concern among those who believed in the
importance of freedom of speech. Despite the fact that the case
concerned an ordinary political speech made to an ordinary political
audience, the First Amendment played no role at all in the decision’s
logic. Debs held that speech could be punished as an attempt to commit
a crime so long as the speech had the “natural tendency and reasonably
probable effect” to cause the commission of the crime and so long as the
speaker had the specific intent to commit the crime.
If we were to diagram the logic of Schenck and Debs, it might look
something like this:
Speech
Insubordination in the Military
Natural tendency and reasonably probable effect
The legal axiom at the basis of Holmes’s decisions in both Schenck
and Debs is that the First Amendment does not prohibit subsequent
punishment for crimes. Each case turns on establishing that the
defendant has committed the substantive crime of attempt. The First
Amendment contributes nothing to the logic of the decisions.
Constitutional concerns simply recede into the margins once it is
determined that a defendant’s speech satisfies the legal elements of an
attempt to commit what the state can legitimately punish as a crime.
In May 1918, Congress amended Section 3 of the 1917 Espionage
Act. It passed the notorious Espionage Act of 1918, which was so
draconian that it soon became known as the Sedition Act. It provided:
[W]hoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully
cause or attempt to cause, or incite or attempt to incite,
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment
service of the United States, and whoever, when the United
44

Id. at 216.
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States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish
any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about
the form of government of the United States, or the
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval
forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or
the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any
language intended to bring the form of government of the
United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the
military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of the
United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the
United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute,
or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any language
intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the
United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies, or shall
willfully display the flag or any foreign enemy, or shall
willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or
language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of
production in this country of any thing or things, product or
products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war
in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by
such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the
prosecution of the war, and whoever shall willfully advocate,
teach defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things
in this section enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act
support or favor the cause of any country with which the
United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of
the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than twenty
years, or both.45
Abrams v. United States,46 which was argued at the Court in October
1919, differed from Schenck and Debs because Jacob Abrams and his codefendants were charged with four counts of violating the 1918
Espionage Act, not the 1917 Espionage Act. The indictment charged the
defendants with conspiring, when the United States was at war with the
Imperial Government of Germany, to unlawfully utter, print, write, and
publish, in the first count, “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language
about the form of government of the United States;” in the second count,
language “intended to bring the form of government of the United States
into contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute;” and in the third count,
language “intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the
United States in said war.” The charge in the fourth count was that the
defendants conspired “when the United States was at war with the
45
46

Espionage Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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Imperial German Government, . . . unlawfully and willfully, by utterance,
writing, printing and publication to urge, incite and advocate
curtailment of production of things and products, to wit, ordnance and
ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.” The
offenses were charged in the language of the act of Congress.47
The Abrams indictment presented entirely different legal issues
than had the indictments in Schenck and Debs. Holmes, always the
master legal technician, was surely alert to these differences. To
appreciate the enormous distinction between Abrams and Debs, we
must concentrate on Counts 1 and 2 of the Abrams indictment:
Count 1: publishing “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language
about the form of government of the United States.”
Count 2: publishing “language ‘intended to bring the form of
government of the United States into contempt, scorn,
contumely, and disrepute.’”48
The principle that Holmes had fashioned to decide both Schenck
and Debs was that speech might constitutionally be punished as an
attempt to commit an underlying crime. In Counts 1 and 2 of Abrams,
however, there is no underlying crime with respect to which Abrams’s
speech might be punished as an attempt. Abrams would still be guilty
of Counts 1 and 2 even if his speech did not have the “natural tendency
and reasonably probable effect” of producing any crime whatsoever.
The government sought to punish Abrams’s speech simpliciter.
Holmes thus could not conceptualize the first two counts of Abrams
through the same lens that he had used the previous March to decide
Schenck and Debs. John H. Clarke’s opinion for the majority blissfully
ignored this difference. It rejected the defendants’ First Amendment
claims for the reason that “[t]his contention is sufficiently discussed and
is definitely negatived in Schenck v. United States.”49 But Holmes was far
too acute to miss the fact that the logic of the first two counts of Abrams
were essentially incompatible with the logic deployed in Schenck and
Debs. The first two counts of Abrams did not charge any “attempt” to
commit any underlying crime.
In fact the first two counts of Abrams revived the age-old crime of
seditious libel, which Blackstone defined as any speech “that may tend
to lessen [the King] in the esteem of his subjects, may weaken his
government, or may raise jealousies between him and his people.”50
47

Id. at 617.
Id.
49 Id. at 619.
50 44 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 123 (Wilfrid Prest
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1765). See W.B. ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND
48
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Seditious libel was designed to protect the “special veneration . . . due”
to those who rule.51 In American jurisprudence, it was said that “[a]
publication is a seditious libel if its object and effect are to disturb the
peace of society or the existence of government.”52

SLANDER 479–98 (4th ed. 1905). In 1724, Sergeant William Hawkins summarized the law
of defamation as reaching its apex in the crime of seditious libel:
Nor can there be any Doubt, but that a Writing which defames private
Persons only, is as much a Libel as that which defames Persons
intrusted with a Publick Capacity, inasmuch as it manifestly tends to
create ill Blood, and to cause a Disturbance of the Publick Peace;
However, it is certain, That it is a very high Aggravation of a Libel that
it tends to scandalize the Government, by reflecting on those who are
intrusted with the Administration of Publick Affairs, which doth not
only endanger the Publick Peace, as all other Libels do, by stirring up
the Parties immediately concerned in it to do Acts of Revenge, but
also has a direct Tendency to breed in the People a Dislike of their
Governors, and incline them to Faction and Sedition.
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL
MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT: DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS 194 (2d ed. 1724).
51 FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL: IN WHICH IS CONTAINED A GENERAL HISTORY OF
THIS LAW IN THE ANCIENT CODES 90 (1816). As Holmes’s English friend Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen analyzed the crime:
Two different views may be taken of the relation between rulers and
their subjects. If the ruler is regarded as the superior of the subject,
as being by the nature of his position presumably wise and good, the
rightful ruler and guide of the whole population, it must necessarily
follow that it is wrong to censure him openly, that even if he is
mistaken his mistakes should be pointed out with utmost respect,
and that whether mistaken or not no censure should be cast upon
him likely or designed to diminish his
authority.
If on the other hand the ruler is regarded as the agent and
servant, and the subject as the wise and good master who is obliged
to delegate his power to the so-called ruler because being a multitude
he cannot use it himself, it is obvious that this sentiment must be
reversed. Every member of the public who censures the ruler for the
time being exercises in his own person the right which belongs to the
whole of which he forms a part. He is finding fault with his servant
. . . . To those who hold this view fully and carry it out to all its
consequences there can be no such offence as sedition.
2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 299–300 (London,
MacMillan & Co.1883).
52 SAMUEL MERRILL, NEWSPAPER LIBEL: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRESS 74 (Boston Ticnor and
Co. ed.) (1888). In 1875, an American author observed:
Such a thing as a prosecution for seditious libel, at least so far as our
knowledge goes, is, and always appears to have been, utterly
unknown. The right of the government, however, to restrain or
punish utterances calculated to diminish its power or weaken its
authority, cannot be supposed, from the fact of its never having been
asserted . . . not to exist. Not only does such right inhere in the
government by virtue of the common law, but an act of congress of
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In Baltzer, Holmes had delicately hinted at a slight qualification of
Patterson, to the extent of asserting “that freedom of speech is not
abridged unconstitutionally in those cases of subsequent punishment
with which this court has had to deal from time to time.”53 But in
December 1918, Holmes had been willing to accept constitutional
protection only for speech “that could not be imagined to do harm.” For
centuries seditious libel had been punished by the common law on the
assumption that it seriously injured the state. Abrams brought Holmes
face to face with the question of whether the First Amendment
prohibited subsequent punishment for the crime of seditious libel,
which the Espionage Act of 1918 had reasserted with a vengeance.
This was for Holmes a question of first impression. It was neither
raised nor decided in either Schenck or Debs. Perhaps it was the
criticism that he received in the months after Debs; perhaps it was the
reading and thinking he had done on the subject of freedom of
expression since the previous March;54 but whatever the cause, Holmes
put at the center of his Abrams dissent a sentence that marks the exact
origin of contemporary First Amendment doctrine: “I wholly disagree
with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the
common law as to seditious libel in force.”55 This was an entirely new
axiom in the jurisprudence of Holmes or of the nation.
It is an axiom that is inconsistent with Holmes’s own unpublished
Baltzer dissent. No one sensitive to the history of the common law could
plausibly contend that seditious libel “could not be imagined to do
harm.” If the First Amendment were to be construed as prohibiting
subsequent punishment for seditious libel, it could not be because
seditious libel was harmless. It must rather be because a proper
understanding of the First Amendment would preclude government
from categorizing the consequences of seditious libel as injuries. Why
might this be so?
An exemplary contribution of the Abrams dissent is to offer an
account of the purpose of the First Amendment that might justify this
conclusion.56 Holmes explained:
July 14, 1798, makes it an indictable offense to libel the government,
congress, or president of the United States.
1 JAMES APPELTON MORGAN, THE LAW OF LITERATURE 76 (New York, James Cockroft &
Co.1875).
53 Baltzer v. United States (unpublished Holmes dissent) (Holmes papers)
(emphasis added).
54 HEALY, supra note 2, at 154–63.
55 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56 Id. At one point Holmes offered a half-hearted historical reason for his startling
conclusion: “I had conceived that the United States through many years had shown its
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Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or
your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate
that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that
he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power
or your premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory
of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.57
Much has been written about the nature and origins of Holmes’s
theory of freedom of expression.58 In the context of this symposium, I
wish only to emphasize that Holmes was provoked to articulate his
novel theory of why the First Amendment prohibited subsequent
punishments for seditious libel in Abrams rather than in Schenck. This
was because in Abrams he was confronting, for the first time, the vast
overreach of the Espionage Act of 1918, which had not been an issue in
either Schenck or Debs.
Having adopted his theory of the marketplace of ideas, however,
Holmes still had to confront counts 3 and 4 of the Abrams indictment:
Count 3: Publishing “language ‘intended to incite, provoke
and encourage resistance to the United States in said war.’”
Count 4: Conspiring “‘when the United States was at war with
the Imperial German Government, . . . unlawfully and willfully,
by utterance, writing, printing and publication to urge, incite
and advocate curtailment of production of things and
products, to wit, ordnance and ammunition, necessary and
essential to the prosecution of the war.’”59

repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, Act of July 14, 1798, c. 73, 1 Stat. 596., by
repaying fines that it imposed.” But this observation could scarcely begin to explain why
the state could not treat the harms of seditious libel as harms equivalent to the injuries
prohibited by the Espionage Act of 1917.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
59 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617. All four counts, Justice Clarke observed, “were charged
in the language of the act of Congress.” Id.
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Counts 3 and 4 posed a serious challenge to Holmes’s newly minted
theory of the First Amendment.
In Schenck and Debs, Holmes had held that the First Amendment
permitted speech that had the “natural tendency and reasonably
probable effect” of producing a crime to be punished as an attempt to
commit that crime. The defendants had been charged with violating the
Espionage Act of 1917, which prohibited causing insubordination
among the troops. It was the job of the jury to determine whether the
defendants’ speech was sufficiently connected to the crime of causing
insubordination to be punished as an attempt to commit that crime.
The Espionage Act of 1918 did not punish conduct, as did the
Espionage Act of 1917. The Espionage Act of 1918 instead punished
speech itself. In the provisions reproduced in Counts 3 and 4, the Act
punished speech intended to incite actions. These counts thus posed a
deep question: if a jury could determine whether a defendant’s speech
could be punished as an attempt to commit an underlying crime, why
could not Congress also determine whether particular kinds of speech
were so intrinsically connected to underlying crimes that they could
also be punished as tantamount to attempts to commit those crimes? If
the speech could be so punished, then Schenck and Debs would seem to
hold that the speech was without constitutional protection.
Resisting the wartime effort of the United States could be made a
crime. Why could Congress not conclude that speech “intended to incite,
provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in war” had the
“natural tendency and reasonably probable effect” of causing that
crime? If the “curtailment of production of things and products, to wit,
ordnance and ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution
of war” could have been made a crime, why could Congress not have
concluded that speech inciting such curtailment had the “natural
tendency and reasonably probable effect” of causing such curtailment?
The theory of Schenck and Debs, in other words, could easily be
formulated in a way that would justify punishment under Counts 3 and
4 of the Abrams indictment. The only necessary additional assumption
would be that Congress could apply the bad tendency test to a class of
speech acts in the same way that a court of law could apply it to a
particular speech act.60
60 This line of reasoning was basically the premise of Sanford’s highly perceptive
opinion six years later in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Sanford upheld a New
York statute that prohibited advocating, advising, or teaching “the duty, necessity or
propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force or violence.”
Id. at 654. Stressing the need to defer to legislative judgments, Sanford wrote that “by
enacting the present statute the State has determined, through its legislative body, that
utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and
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Avoiding this conclusion required Holmes to think hard about the
implications of his new theory of the First Amendment. He realized that
if Congress could punish all speech that might have the simple tendency
of causing illegal action, it could effectively shut down the marketplace
of ideas, whose protection Holmes was proposing as the essential
purpose of the First Amendment. The fundamental premise of Holmes’s
new theory of the First Amendment was that “Congress certainly cannot
forbid all effort to change the mind of the country.”61 But the bad
tendency test was so baggy and encompassing that it could easily
produce exactly this result, whether applied by courts or by Congress.
The problem, then, lay with the “bad tendency” test of Schenck and
Debs. That test was derived from the substantive criminal law of
attempt. But in Abrams Holmes came to realize that the distinctive
purpose of the First Amendment required a different test. Holmes
therefore used his Abrams dissent to fashion innovative First
Amendment doctrine designed to protect the marketplace of ideas by
overriding the substantive criminal law of attempt:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that
would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United
States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is
intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will
bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United
States constitutionally may seek to prevent. . . . It is only the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about

unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of
substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That
determination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor
of the validity of the statute.” Id. at 668. In his subsequent brilliant concurrence in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Brandeis precisely denied the assumption
that Congress and courts were equally competent to assess the threats of harm caused
by speech:
The Legislature must obviously decide, in the first instance, whether
a danger exists which calls for a particular protective measure. But
where a statute is valid only in case certain condition exist, the
enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are
essential to its validity. Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly been
held invalid, because unnecessary, where the denial of liberty
involved was that of engaging in a particular business. The powers
of the courts to strike down an offending law are no less when the
interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental
personal rights of free speech and assembly.
Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
61 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of
opinion where private rights are not concerned.62
“Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the
correction of evil counsels to time,” Holmes concluded, “warrants
making any exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech.’”63
With this conclusion, Holmes radically revised the holdings of
Schenck and Debs. The test of imminent emergency deployed in Abrams
was new First Amendment doctrine created to protect the marketplace
of ideas by constraining the substantive criminal law of attempt. This
protection required that the connection between speech and harm be
foreshortened and tightened, which we might graphically portray in this
way:
Schenck & Debs:

Speech

Crime
Tendency

Abrams:

Speech

Crime
Imminence

Holmes used his novel First Amendment test to conclude that
Abrams’s speech was constitutionally protected. Counts 3 and 4 of the
Abrams indictment were unconstitutional precisely because nobody
could “suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an
unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that
its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms.”64
The reconstructive genius of Holmes’s Abrams dissent was thus
deep and far-reaching. The new legal questions raised by the Espionage
Act of 1918 prompted Holmes not only to develop a new theory of the
First Amendment but also to conceptualize the implications of that
theory for legislation seeking to regulate speech as “an act” punishable
as an attempt to commit a crime. The pressure placed upon Holmes by
his friends in the months after Debs may well have motivated Holmes to
rethink his attitude toward the First Amendment. But it was the
unprecedented legal challenge presented by the Abrams indictment that
channeled Holmes’s thinking into the doctrinal implications of
forbidding prosecutions for seditious libel, which in the end required
constitutional limitations on the criminal law of attempt.
62
63
64

Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 630–31.
Id. at 628.
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The novel theories propounded by Holmes in Abrams implied that
eight months previously Holmes had himself sanctioned the
unconstitutional conviction of Eugene Debs. Holmes was, however, a
proud man. “I should like to be admitted to be the greatest jurist in the
world,” he once wrote to a close friend.65 The admission of gross
constitutional error was not easy for Holmes.
Fortunately the young Zechariah Chafee offered Holmes a way out
of this potential embarrassment. We know that Holmes met with Chafee
in the summer of 1919 and that Holmes then had on his desk Chafee’s
brilliant article on Freedom of Speech in War Time.66 Chafee took the
innovative (if “disingenuous”)67 tack of focusing on this sentence from
Holmes’s language in Schenck: “The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”68 Although
Holmes had not intended in Schenck for this loose language to displace
or supersede the bad tendency test, Chafee nevertheless seized upon it
to argue that it propounded constitutional doctrine that “clearly makes
the punishment of words for their bad tendency impossible.”69
Chafee’s interpretation of Schenck was largely fanciful. As he
acknowledged, it could not be reconciled with Holmes’s nearly
simultaneous opinion in Debs.70 But Chafee had serendipitously hit
upon a fig leaf that could save Holmes from the charge of inconsistency.
In his Abrams dissent, Holmes would actually propose a constitutional
test to which the phrase “clear and present danger” might aptly apply.
Beginning in 1920, Holmes (and Brandeis) would insist on the
fiction that in Schenck Holmes had spoken for a unanimous Court to hold
that subsequent punishments of speech were constitutionally

65

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan (January
31, 1913), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 58 (David H. Burton, ed., 1976).
66 Chafee, supra note 5; HEALY, supra note 2, at 154–59.
67 HEALY, supra note 2, at 157.
68 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Chafee, supra note 5, at 967.
69 Chafee, supra note 5, at 967.
70 Id. at 967–68 (“If the Supreme Court had applied this same standard of ‘clear and
present danger’ to the utterances of Eugene V. Debs, . . . it is hard to see how he could
have been held guilty.”).
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restrained by the “clear and present danger” test.71 Six years later in
Gitlow v. New York,72 for example, Holmes announced in dissent:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must
be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view
of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as there
used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat
larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by
the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the
laws of the United States. If I am right then I think that the
criterion sanctioned by the full Court in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, applies:
‘The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that [the
State] has a right to prevent.’73
Nothing could be further from the truth. Holmes in Schenck had not
written an opinion about the First Amendment. He had instead defined
the substantive criminal law of attempt. The fiction invented by Chafee,
and embraced by both Holmes and Brandeis, was that Schenck
foreshadowed the Abrams dissent. But it did not. Chafee’s fiction may
have been face-saving, but it also effaced the profound change that had
overtaken Holmes in the period between March and November of 1919.
In reconstructing that change, the sharp legal differences between the
Espionage Act of 1917 and the Espionage Act of 1918 must be
emphasized and understood. Only in that way can we begin to
appreciate the true magnitude of Holmes’s achievement.

71 See Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting,
joined by Holmes J.) (“The extent to which Congress may, under the Constitution,
interfere with free speech, was in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 declared by a
unanimous court to be this: ‘The question in every case is whether the words . . . are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree.’”); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 255, 271–
72 (1920) (separate opinion of Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J.); Gilbert v. Minnesota,
254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.) (“That the necessity which is
essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended
to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the state
constitutionally may seek to prevent has been settled. See Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52.”).
72 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
73 Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

